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A basic problem with the ever-changing Hungarian retirement rules has been that they created 
excessive shares of gainers and of losers. Certain workers with long (and continuous) employment 
could retire well below the normal retirement age (NRA) with full benefi t. Other workers, with 
fragmented and therefore short employment had to work until reaching the ever rising NRA. A pe-
culiar consequence of these rules is the strong negative correlation between the retirement age and 
the length of contribution. Moving in the direction of a fair system, like the Nonfi nancial Defi ned 
Contribution system, would improve sustainability and fairness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the transition from a command economy to a market economy, the Hun-
garian pension system has evolved frequently in confusing ways. In the 1990s, the 
system had to be adapted to the collapse of employment and rising inflation. Fol-
lowing the World Bank suggestions, in 1998 the government partially privatised 
the public pension system and strengthened the role of defined contribution in the 
remaining dominant public pillar. Under the influence of the Great Recession, a 
new government practically renationalised the mandatory private pillar in 2011. 
Anticipating the long-term population aging, subsequent Hungarian govern-
ments raised the normal female/male retirement age step by step from 55/60 
(1996) to 62 (by 2009 and 2001, respectively) and legislated further increases 
from 62 to 65 (by 2022). Fearing unemployment, however, the deduction for 
early retirement was too low and frequently zero for those workers who had a 
long enough contribution (37–40 years), including years spent in education and 
raising children. Since 2011/2012, the present government eliminated early re-
tirement for all males and for those females who had less than 40 years of rights, 
while opening the way for early retirement without deduction for those females 
who had at least 40 years of rights, called Females 40 (Table A3.1 summarises 
the most important parametric changes.) As a result, the effective retirement age 
has not risen enough (Table 8) and the fairness, to be defined later, has even de-
creased further. 
Though the issues of the two previous paragraphs are loosely related, we shall 
separate them. The bulk of the Hungarian literature focused its attention on the 
problems mentioned in paragraph 1 and hardly paid attention to the problems 
mentioned in paragraph 2. In contrast, in the present paper, we skip the problems 
of the benefit-wage schedule and concentrate on the issues of impact of the retire-
ment rules. 
Our main results are as follows: (i) using a very simple theoretical model with 
an average earning path, we define the gainers and losers of various theoreti-
cal and existing (Hungarian) pension schemes with respect to an ideal nonfinan-
cial defined contribution (NDC) system or its linearised version; (ii) calculating 
theoretical and empirical correlation coefficients between retirement age and the 
length of contribution, we argue that negative values indicate unfair retirement 
rules. Here we only name two extreme types: females working 40 years and retir-
ing at age 58 (gainers), and females working 39 years, but not allowed to retire at 
age 61 (losers) in 2013, who will not be allowed to retire at age 64 in 2022.  
We are convinced that the current rigid/exceptional system – which is almost 
a singularity in the international scene – should be replaced by a flexible (vari-
able) retirement system as soon as possible. Further work is needed to determine 
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the socially optimal values of the parameters of the Hungarian pension system: 
the earliest retirement age, the deduction for early retirement, and the bonus for 
delayed retirement. Note that we speak of flexible retirement if adding a year to 
the length of contributions or to the retirement age strongly increases the retire-
ment benefit, opening the way to the flexible choice of the retirement age like the 
NDC1 , where the annual benefit is approximately equal to the ratio of the lifetime 
contributions to the remaining life expectancy. A further flexibility is provided by 
the partial retirement: two retirement ages exist, and between them, the workers 
only work part-time and receive corresponding partial pensions. 
The Hungarian public pension system has been critically analysed in a number 
of publications (e.g. Augusztinovics et al. 2002 and Simonovits 2008). Augusz-
tinovics – Köllő (2008, 2009) documented the detrimental impact of fragmented 
working paths on the corresponding pension benefits. Cseres-Gergely (2008) 
studied the role of incentives in early retirement. Molnár – Hollós Marosi (2015) 
presented data showing the dependence of life expectancy on the wage/bene-
fit and the retirement age. In parallel to Bajkó et al. (2015), Freudenberg et al. 
(2016) considered the long-term impact of recent reforms, including that of the 
retirement rules. According to the latter estimates, the rise of the normal retire-
ment age plus the elimination of early retirement reduce the pension deficit by 
0.5% of the GDP, while the introduction of Females 40 increases the deficit by 
the same amount.
We relegate the classical literature to a footnote2 and turn to the new wave of pa-
pers concentrating on other dimensions of the retirement problem from the US as 
well as EU. For example, Chan – Stevens (2004) looked for an answer to the ques-
tion, “How does job loss affect the timing of retirement?”. Staubli – Zweimüller 
(2013) and Manoli – Weber (2016) studied a similar question, “Does raising the 
early retirement age increase employment of older workers?”. Perhaps the clos-
1  Though we call the NDC an ideal system in this paper, we must signal that it also has pitfalls. 
The government does not know or does not want to know the dependence of life expectancy 
on the retirement age and the lifetime average wage (for example, within a given sex, it does 
not know that the retirement age signals the expected remaining life and with good reason, it 
does not want to know the mortality difference between males and females). Therefore, the 
traditional insurance rules are not fair (see, for example, Eső – Simonovits 2002; Diamond 
2003; Eső et al. 2011; Krémer 2015), but here we neglect this complication.
2  Gustman – Steinmeier (1986) published a structural model of retirement to the US public 
pension system, assuming that retirees maximise their lifetime utility functions. Considering 
the interaction of the Social Security and the private pension system with defined benefit, 
Stock – Wise (1990) were able to explain the emergence of two peaks around the earliest and 
the normal retirement ages (62 and 65). Rust – Phelan (1997) analysed a standard model of 
retirement behaviour under the influence of Social Security and Medicare and private wealth. 
The volume edited by Gruber – Wise (2007) provides a good survey on the topic.
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est to our paper is Etgeton (2016), entitled “Labor Market Frictions, Retirement 
and Inequality”. We only quote one observation (from the abstract): “widespread 
reform effectiveness is hampered by the heterogeneous availability of jobs.”
The structure of the remaining part of the paper is as follows: Section 2 models 
flexible (variable) pension systems. Section 3 moves to the earlier permissive 
Hungarian system, and Section 4 continues with the present (exceptional/rigid) 
one. Section 5 draws the conclusions. Three appendices complete the paper: Ap-
pendix 1 formally defines the welfare ranking of any two systems and the partial 
retirement. Appendix 2 illustrates the dependence of the correlation coefficient 
and the welfare on the fairness of the system in a numerical model. Appendix 3 
contains important general Hungarian statistics, also used to transform numbers 
from absolute into relative values in the main text. 
2. FLEXIBLE (VARIABLE) SYSTEM
First, we outline the general framework and then analyse two types of flexible 
(variable) systems: the so-called nonfinancial defined contribution system and 
the linear benefit rule.
2.1. Framework
In every pension system, three main individual variables determine the bene-
fit: the length of contribution S, the retirement age R, and the average lifetime 
gross wage w.3 To simplify the analysis, we work with constant prices and wages. 
Sometimes we only consider a single cohort. We shall generally skip disability or 
survivor beneficiaries, but in Tables 3 and 4, in addition to the old-age pensioners, 
the former category is also considered and disability is taken into account. 
First, we need a function, connecting average lifetime gross and net wages: v 
= T(w). In Hungary, this function is proportional: v = θw, (θ = 0.66) in 40 years, 
but now it is still strongly progressive (concave), and this special feature strongly 
influences the initial benefits and benefits in payment. In calculating fairness, 
b(R, S, T(w)) is the corresponding benefit function. We should take into account 
3  Years of contribution contain years at higher studies and raising small children. In reality, 
when the ratio of own wage to average wage varies annually, the rules are more complicated, 
but we skip this complication.
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that the expected remaining life expectancy at age R also depends on the gross 
average lifetime wage w: eR,w.4
Assuming that the pension contribution is proportional to the gross wage (i.e. 
by neglecting the cap on the contribution base effective between 1993 and 2012), 
and denoting the presumptive time-invariant contribution rate by τ, the expected 
lifetime balance of type (R, S, w) is given by  
 d (R, S, w) = τw S – b (R, S, T(w)) eR,w. (1) 
2.2. Nonfi nancial defi ned contribution (NDC) system
For an NDC (denoted by index I for ideal), the expected lifetime balance is zero 
for every type, therefore the pension rule is defined as 
 bI (R, S, T(w)) = τ w S/ eR,w , where S ≥ Sm and R ≥ Rm , (2)
Sm = minimum length, Rm = minimum (earliest) retirement age; note that here the 
normal retirement age R* does not play any role.
Even in the NDC, the dependence of eR,w on w is neglected, rather it is simply 
assumed that eR,w = eR, therefore (2) is replaced by
 bI (R, S, T(w)) = τ w S/ eR . (2’)
As a side remark, we note that the estimation of the expected life span at retire-
ment is a very difficult problem and in the past decades, eR was typically signifi-
cantly underestimated. 
Turning to imperfect systems, it is worth defining the gainers and losers in 
a system M with respect to the ideal system I. We have no structural param-
eters characterising the various types, therefore we distinguish and index types as 
points of a sufficiently fine 3-dimensional grid: i =1, 2,…, n; (Ri(I), Si(I), wi) are 
compared to the alternative outcomes (Ri(M), Si(M), wi).  
We can give more than one definition for the gainers and losers.
(1) With respect to the annual benefit, system M is better than system I for type 
i, if and only if type i receives higher benefit in M than in I for outcome (Ri(M), 
Si(M), wi):
 bM (Ri(M), Si(M), wi) > bI (Ri(M), Si(M), wi). 
4  We do not denote that this parameter characterises a given cohort t, for example, those born in 
year t. As is well known, this life expectancy increases with the wage and decreases with the 
age, but more slowly than the age increases.
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Remark. If the comparison is made on the basis of I rather than M, the cor-
responding condition bM (Ri(I), Si(I), wi) > bI (Ri(I), Si(I), wi) may not hold.
(2) With respect to the net contribution, or lifetime balance, system M is bet-
ter than system I for type i, if and only if her net balance is negative for the out-
come:
 dM (Ri(M), Si(M), wi) < 0.
Remark. As before, it is not guaranteed that dM (Ri(I), Si(I), wi) < 0 also 
holds.
The third definition will be given in Appendix 1 later.
2.3. Linear fl exible system
Formula (2) is further simplified, namely linearised in other cases and gross wage 
is replaced by net wage. For a given earning and length of contribution, the net 
(i.e. after tax) benefit is an increasing linear function of the retirement age: 
  b(R, S, w) = [1+ δ(R – R*)]γ S T(w), (3) 
where R*, δ, and γ are positive constants.
R* is the normal retirement age, Rm < R* < RM, δ is the delayed/early retire-
ment coefficient, and γ is the constant accrual rate in terms of the net average 
wage. Here it is not self-evident that the net balance is identically zero: d(R, S, 
w) ≡ 0, therefore we have to require that at least their expected value be zero. Let 
pR,S,w  > 0 be the relative share of type (R, S, w), their sum is being equal to 1. By 
definition, in a balanced pension system, the expected value of the net balances 
is zero: 
   ∑pR,S,w d (R, S, w) = 0. (4)
Inserting equation (1) and (3) into (4) yields a condition for the system is bal-
anced: 
  ∑ pR,S,w {τw– [1+ δ(R – R*)]γ T(w) e R, w} S = 0. (5)
We do not consider the problem of balance when it is taken for the whole 
population rather than a single cohort. Accepting ex post analysis, a simple equa-
tion is obtained for either the accrual rate γ or the contribution rate τ: 
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   τ ∑ pR,S,w wS = γ ∑ pR,S,w [1+ δ(R – R*)] T(w) S eR, w.  (6)
To avoid arbitrariness, we have to stipulate that in a genuinely flexible system, 
the normal retirement age R* lies years above the minimum retirement age Rm, 
years below the maximum retirement age RM and the delayed retirement coeffi-
cient δ is several percent/year. Moreover, there may be a malus δ1 and a bonus δ2 
for early and delayed retirement, respectively, rather than a uniform δ.
Table 1 displays the linear flexible benefits for selected contribution lengths and 
retirement ages, calculating with the normal retirement age (NRA) of 62 valid in 
Hungary until 2012, with δ1 = 0.03 and δ2 = 0.06. For example, if somebody retires 
at age 60 with 38 years of service, he/she receives 71.6% of his/her net earning. 
The benefit in the cell (58, 40) is only 70.4%. We shall base our evaluation of the 
distortion caused in the exemptional/rigid system in Table 7 on this calculation.
Table 1. Linear flexible benefits – retirement ages and length of contribution
Years of contribution, S
Retirement age, R
36 38 40 42 44
58 0.634 0.669 0.704 0.739 0.774
60 0.677 0.714 0.752 0.790 0.827
62 0.720 0.760 0.800 0.840 0.880
64 0.806 0.851 0.896 0.941 0.986
66 0.893 0.942 0.941 1.042 1.091
Note: In terms of net wage. Model calculations.
Rising real earnings and price indexation together may complicate the picture.5
3. SYSTEM WITH EXEMPTION (HUNGARY UNTIL 2011)
We shall relate the system with exemption prevailing in Hungary until 2012 to 
the foregoing flexible system. Unlike in (3), the value of δ was a sophisticated 
function of the length of contribution: 
5  If in year t, a worker retires at age R with contribution length S, and average lifetime gross 
wage wt, his/her benefit is equal to bt(R, S, T(wt)). Calculating with full employment for the 
last year, due to a delay of one year, his/her new initial benefit would be equal to bt(R+1, S+1, 
T(wt+1))gt+1, where gt+1 is the growth factor of the net wage from year t to t+1. Applying the 
pure price indexation, the new benefit should be compared to bt(R, S, T(wt)). The delay raises 
the yield of any extra year gt+1 –1, except during the period 2013–2015, when the overindexa-
tion of pensions in payment amounted to 8% .
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  b(R,S,w) = [1+ δS (R – R*)] γ ST(w) , (3’) 
where δS is a non strictly decreasing function of the length of contribution: 
(S=Sm,..,So), δSo =0, where So is the critical value of the length of contribution 
(e.g. 35 or 40 years), implying full benefits. 
In such a system with exemption, almost every worker retired as soon as it was 
possible, i.e. when he/she reached the prescribed critical length of contribution So. 
As is obvious, in such a system, working until NRA hardly increases the benefit, 
but lifts the net balance of contribution, causing a loss to the worker. 
By the way, we can obtain a more precise description about this system, if 
we replace γS by a more complex series (cS), representing the accumulated ac-
crual rates. Table 2 displays the selected values, between the subsequent benching 
points, the function is a linear one (row 2). For example, cS = 0.02S for 40 ≤ S ≤ 
50, but for S ≥ 50, cS = 1 (constant); below 40, its slope changes haphazardly. For 
example, for S lying between 36 and 40, cS = 0.74 + 0.015 (S – 36). Row 3 gives 
a hypothetical proportional scheme. In addition, the series of valorised net wages 
(vt) and their progressive (concave) average also play a role.
Table 2. Accumulated accrual rates
Length of contribution (S)
Replacement 
20 25 36 40
Actual (cS) 0.53 0.63 0.74 0.80
Proportional (γS) 0.40 0.50 0.72 0.80
Note: In terms of (lifetime valorised) net wage. Official data.
In addition to these factors, due to changing rules, the parameter values in 
equation (3’) also depend on the calendar year, but for the time being, this de-
pendence is neglected. In the Hungarian practice, the length of contribution is 
downward rounded-off from month to years, but the retirement age is given in 
months. The benefit also depends on gender (f = female, m = male).
The simplest tool to characterise the distortion, due to the system with exemp-
tion, is the paradoxically negative correlation between the length of contribution 
and the retirement age. We recall the definition of the correlation coefficient be-
tween two random variables. Let R and S be random variables of the retirement 
age and of the length of contribution, ER and ES their expected values, and DR 
and DS their standard deviations, respectively. In this case, their coefficient of 
correlation is defined as ρ(R, S) = E [(R–ER) (S–ES)]/[ DR DS]. As is known, 
this index lies between –1 and 1. For a negative correlation, the decrease in the 
index shows the strengthening of the correlation. In the usual one-dimensional 
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framework, we expect strong positive correlation, but in reality, the correlation 
is negative (for theoretical details, see Appendix 2). Making our Figures 1–3, we 
relied on data base “Nyugdmeg”,6 containing the aggregated pension decisions 
for the period 2003–2010.
According to Figure 1, the foregoing male correlation was “only” –0.3 in 
2003, but it dropped to –0.45 by 2007. For females, the situation is even more 
paradox: it started from –0.4 and dropped to –0.7 by 2010. This is a sign of the 
strengthening impact of the exemption, neutralising the benevolent impact of the 
rising normal retirement age.
To exclude outliers, we confine our attention to those who had at least 20 
years of contribution (the recent minimum value). Similarly to Figure 1, Figure 2 
6  Database “Nyugdmeg” contains the retirement decisions concerning the period 1999–2010, 
aggregated according to birth year, retirement year and month, gender, length of contribution, 
average pension, and the valorised net earning. Access to these data can be required from the 
Central Administration of National Pension Institute.
Figure 1. Correlation for those retiring above 54, between 2003 and 2010
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also reports a negative and time-decreasing correlation, only the values are less 
extreme.
Further delimiting the analysis, we only consider those who retired at or above 
the normal retirement age. Figure 3 still reports a negative correlation, but with 
low absolute values.
Note, that Granseth et al. (2016) repeated this calculation for Austria, Ger-
many, and Sweden, and obtained partly similar, partly different results.
Now, we are moving from aggregate statistics to a somewhat disaggregated 
analysis. In a fair pension system, the benefits are smooth functions of the length 
of contribution and the retirement age. In contrast, we shall see that this is only 
partly fulfilled in the Hungarian system. 
Tables 3 and 4 display the relative size and the relative benefit of those male 
and female groups whose members retired in 2011 on their own right, breaking 
down the data according to retirement age and length of contribution. (Confining 
attention to old-age pensioners would yield similar results.) To have perspicuous 
Figure 2. Correlation for those retiring above 54, with minimum 20 years of contribution, 
between 2003 and 2010
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tables, we drop the categories with extreme lengths of contributions. Note that the 
ratio of the number of all new male retirees (55,100 in Table A3.6) to that of be-
ing in normal retirement age (57,000, Table A3.4) is about 97.4% and the relative 
benefit (with respect to the nationwide net wage, 144,100 HUF) is equal to 71%, 
reaching its peak at the retirement age of 61 with 99%. 
The related numbers for females in Table 4 (using the absolute numbers from 
Table A3.7) are as follows: retirement ratio is equal to 135% and the relative 
benefit is equal to 66%, reaching its peak at the retirement age of 60 with 86%. 
2011 was a singular year when the Females 40 was already introduced, but the 
permissive system of early retirement was still valid. Furthermore, the minimal 
retirement age of female cohort 1952 just rose from 57 to 59. We call the Read-
er’s attention to the bifurcation at the length of contribution of 40. For example, 
considering employees retiring at 60, those with length of contribution of 35–39 
have a benefit of 56.7%, while those with length of contribution of 40–44 have a 
benefit of 105.9%.
Figure 3. Correlation for those retiring at or above the normal retirement age, 
between 2003 and 2010
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4. EXCEPTIONAL/RIGID SYSTEM (HUNGARY FROM 2012)
We shall put the present Hungarian system into a model framework and then 
display its impact in table form.
4.1. Framework
The analysis of the current (exceptional/rigid) Hungarian system is more impor-
tant than the previous system (with exemptions). Since in the new system the 
distinction between females and males has reappeared, we should double all our 
equations correspondingly (generally omitted). The aggregated balance equations 
(4) and (5) would be obtained by the summation of the two variants.  
Table 3. Relative size and benefits of male groups retired in 2011 
– retirement age and length of contribution
Age Size – Length of contribution Benefit – Length of contribution
35–39 40–44 (Full sample)Total 35–39 40–44
(Full sample)
Average
54–55 0.012 0.005 0.033 0.710 0.768 0.627
56–57 0.012 0.019 0.044 0.769 0.802 0.708
58–59 0.019 0.110 0.160 0.797 0.826 0.807
60 0.047 0.239 0.378 0.555 0.753 0.732
61 0.005 0.021 0.031 0.567 1.118 0.983
62–63 0.030 0.030 0.160 0.559 1.246 0.667
Total 0.139 0.422 0.974 0.637 0.827 0.707
Source: ONYF (2012, p. 109: Table 9.1). 
Note: Relative benefit = benefit/nationwide net wage.
Table 4. Relative size and benefits of female groups retired in 2011 
– retirement age and length of contribution
Age Size – Length of contribution Benefit – Length of contribution
30–34 35–39 40–44 Total 30–34 35–39 40–44 Average
54–55 0.004 0.010 0.091 0.115 0.515 0.606 0.638 0.612
56–57 0.003 0.013 0.336 0.357 0.476 0.623 0.681 0.672
58–59 0.006 0.089 0.498 0.599 0.455 0.576 0.783 0.747
60 0.003 0.006 0.017 0.027 0.410 0.576 1.059 0.865
61 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.415 0.555 1.108 0.739
62–63 0.027 0.006 0.003 0.113 0.441 0.530 1.103 0.475
Total 0.065 0.131 0.949 1.347 0.486 0.581 0.739 0.661
Source: ONYF (2012, p. 109: Table 9.2).
RETIREMENT RULES IN HUNGARY 371
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
Equation (3) is replaced by the equation of the favoured females: 
  b(R, S, w) = γS T(w) if S  ≥ 40 and R < R*. (7)
Equation (3) is modified into the equation below for all the others, retiring in 
the rigid system: 
  b(R, S, w)  = [1+ δ(R – R*)]cS T(w)    if  R  ≥ R*. (8)
There is a further complication: years spent in vocational schools and higher 
education before 1998 are counted in the formula but no in the condition of (8). 
A smaller, but similar problem arises with the years spent in raising a child below 
age 3. Currently (2017), the parameter values of the Hungarian system are as fol-
lows: R* = 63.5 years: δ = 0.06 and γ = 0.02, Rm = R*, early retirement is only 
allowed for women, if S ≥ 40, but without any deduction; minimum length of 
contribution: Sm = 20 years.
4.2. Females 40
Table 5 displays the data of the Females 40 programme as it stood in 20137. The 
largest cohort is of 1955, its average retirement age is about 58 years, and its aver-
age length of contribution is about 41 years. The majority retired with 40 years of 
rights, but 15% and 11% with 42 and 43 years, respectively.
Table 5. Data of Females 40, 2013
Birth
year
Size
distri-
bution, %
Average
retirement 
age
Average
length of
employment
Size distribution according to contribution 
length,
%
40 41 42 43 44
1953     4.9 60.0 41.5 37.7 29.4 18.4   4.9 5.1
1954   26.6 59.0 41.1 59.7 16.1   8.5   8.5 4.4
1955   32.9 58.2 41.1 61.4   9.3 15.2 10.5 1.7
1956   17.7 57.1 41.7 31.2 17.4 37.8 11.3 0.0
1957     9.3 56.1 40.7 65.6 23.6   7.2   0.0 *
1958     4.7 55.2 40.3 87.1   9.7   *   * *
Average 100.0 57.9 41.1 56.3 14.8 15.9   8.2 2.0
Source: ONYF (2014, p. 111–112, Table 6.9)
7 For its details see Mihályi – Vincze 2016.
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Table 6 shows the relative benefits of the same categories. The original (un-
censored) table also demonstrates that those newly retired who were born in 1951 
(0.3%) had an average net valorised wage of 118%, while those born in 1952 
(1.3%) had only 103.5%. Our censored table displays that those born in 1956 or 
later had still a lower average net valorised wage of 83.3%.
Table 6. Relative benefits of Females 40, retiring in 2013, in terms of nationwide net wage
Birth
year
Relative
average
earning 
Average
initial
benefit
Average
length of
rights
Size distribution according to contribution 
length,
%
40 41 42 43 44
1953 0.938 0.771 40.5 70.6 18.2 6.9 2.3 1.2
1954 0.954 0.776 40.2 86.9 10.4 1.8 0.6 0.2
1955 0.954 0.775 40.2 90.2   8.0 1.2 0.4 0.2
1956 0.793 0.655 40.2 89.8   8.8 1.0 0.3 0.2
1957 0.792 0.639 40.2 91.7   7.6 0.6 0.0 *
1958 0.760 0.609 40.1 95.0   5.0 * * *
Average 0.897 0.731 40.2 88.2   9.1 1.5 0.6 0.3
Source: ONYF (2014, p. 111–112, Table 6.9) censored, and Table A3.3. 
To make the tables shorter, we cut out the less important very early and very 
late birth years (–1952 and 1959+, respectively) and the similarly extremely short 
and long length of contributions (–39 and 45+, respectively): the displayed shares 
do not add up to 1. Similarly, the averages refer to the whole population.
Judging fairness, in addition to the retirement age and the length of contribu-
tion, we have to take into account the remaining life expectancy. To widen the 
analysis, we cite a number of important data from 2012 about the dependence 
of life expectancy on the earning in Hungary from the path-breaking study of 
Molnár – Hollós Marosi (2015). Dropping the lowest decile of pensions (to avoid 
complications stemming from partial pensions received by emigrants), the fore-
going paper divided the members of the remaining nine deciles into four equal 
parts. For example, for males, the lowest benefits were between 43.2 and 61.2% 
of average net earning, while their life expectancy at 60 was equal to 17.1 years. 
The highest benefits started at 104.3% and the respective life expectancy was 
four years longer. The female earnings were uniformly lower and the life expect-
ancy hardly depended on the earning.8
8  The foregoing study presents interesting data on the dependence of life expectancy and the 
retirement age, too. Unfortunately, the categories are too large, therefore only slight differ-
ences arise. For example, in 2012, Hungarian males who retired before reaching age 59 had a 
RETIREMENT RULES IN HUNGARY 373
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
One of the main issues of the present paper is as follows: what is the impact 
of the elimination of early retirement except for Females 40? Table 7 translates 
the model calculations of Table 1 to the exceptional/rigid system. Rows 4–6 are 
dropped, since they are identical to those of Table 1. Returning to our earlier 
examples: 0 benefit stands in cell (60, 38), while for females, cell (58, 40) jumps 
from 70.4% to 80%! This is obviously unfair.
Table 7. Exceptional/rigid benefits – retirement ages and length of contribution (females)
Years of contribution, S
Retirement age, R
36 38 40 42 44
58 0 0 0.80 0.84 0.88
60 0 0 0.80 0.84 0.88
Note: In terms of net wage. Model calculations.
Now, it is time to present some data on real outcomes. First Table 8 displays 
the characteristics of males, females, and Females 40 between 2006 and 2014. 
The outcome is chaotic. The relative size of newly retired cohorts developed er-
ratically. For example, in 2010, the number of newly retired females (13,600) was 
as low as 20% of the number of those females of normal retirement age (68,800), 
while in 2011, it jumped to 119% (84,900 /71,100). In 2007, 101% of males of 
the cohort size retired (50,900/50,300), while in 2008, only 54% (25,700/47,400). 
Of course, everything can be explained by the erratic developments of the two 
groups of rules (benefit–wage schedule and retirement rules). Or, to give another 
example, in 2010, females delayed their retirement until the much more favour-
able era starting in 2011. In 2007, males (and females) surpassed the sudden 
decrease of 8% in the initial pensions announced for 2008, in 2014, the normal 
retirement age rose by ½ year. 
4.3. Detailed observations
Using the so-called Attached Administrative Data Base of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences,9 we can obtain a finer picture on the situation of the newly 
retired females between 2002 and 2011. Taking into account our topic, we shall 
remaining life expectancy of 14.9 years, while those retiring older than 61, had another 16.1 
years. (The corresponding demographic numbers are 16.7 and 15.4 years, respectively.) For 
females, those retiring between 50 and 54 years had another 22.5 years, while those retiring 
beyond 61 years, live only slightly longer: 23.1 years. (Note that the unofficial data of Eső et 
al. 2011, Tables A1–A2, cited much larger differences for those who died in 2004.)
9 Access to these data can be required from the Data Bank, e-mail address: adatbank@mta.hu
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distinguish three types of old-age retirement: early retirement, Females 40 and 
“normal” retirement (ironically referring to the rare retirement at NRA). We shall 
compare now the three groups (with respect to fragmentation of career, earning 
before retirement, and the initial pension).
A lot of Hungarian statistics attest that the share of early retirees was high; 
moreover, normal retirement has been an exception rather than the rule. The 
changes in the average retirement age only follow the changes in the law. Already 
commenting on Table 6, we called the Reader’s attention to the critical role of the 
length of contribution of 40, and to the inequalities in benefits (present between 
those who retire with 35–39 and 40–44 years of contribution, respectively).
Table 8. Retirement ages and relative sizes: males, females and Females 40
Year
Males Females Females 40
Average 
retirement
age (year)
Relative
size
Average 
retirement
age (year)
Relative
size
Average 
retirement
age (year)
Relative size
2006 59.9 0.638 57.5 0.758
2007 59.7 1.012 57.8 1.028
2008 59.8 0.542 57.3 0.611
2009 59.7 0.727 59.9 0.239
2010 60.2 0.676 60.7 0.198
2011 60.3 0.753 58.5 1.194 57.6   0.769*
2012 62.0 0.365 59.1 0.727 57.8 0.374
2013 62.2 0.356 59.5 0.544 57.8 0.329
2014 62.2 0.249 59.3 0.484 58.2 0.360
Source: Fazekas – Varga (2015, p. 262, Table 11.5) and Tables A3.4 and A3.5. 
Note: * The number for Females 40 in 2011 also contains those who retired earlier, but were reclassified in 
2011.
Table 9. Female pensioners of 2011: average last earning and initial benefit
Type of retirement Relative 
average benefit
Share, % Relative average 
earning 
3 months 
before retirement
Share of employed
3 months 
before retirement
Females 40 (54–59) 0.772 43.5 1.289 39.7 
Early pensioners 0.822 17.8 1.565 10.3 
Females retiring 
at the normal 
retirement age
0.432   6.1   0.802 1.3
Note: In terms of nationwide net wage. Administrative data.
RETIREMENT RULES IN HUNGARY 375
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
Applying our administrative data, we were unable to take into account the 
length of contribution, but we relied on the initial pensions and the earnings be-
fore retirement. According to Table 9, the participants in Females 40 had as ben-
efits 77.2% of the average net wage, somewhat lagged behind those of early 
retirees (82.2%), but surpassed by far those of the “normal” retirees (43.2%). 
Table 10 breaks down the category of those pensioners who retired in the first 
year of starting Females 40 into three age-groups. With the rise of the retirement 
age, not only the relative benefits, but also the relative value of pre-retirement net 
wage with respect to the nationwide net wage grew steeply: 76.5% (aged 54–56) 
vs. 94.8% (aged 58–59).
Table 10. The pension and pre-retirement date of Females 40 in three age-groups, 2011
Retirement age Relative
average
benefit
Relative size Ratio of gross
wage to the average one
The relative size of the 
workers groups 3 months 
before retirement
54–56 0.701 0.184 0.765 0.173
57 0.744 0.163 0.802 0.149
58–59 0.836 0.260 0.948 0.236
Note: In terms of nationwide net wage. Administrative data.
Looking at Figure 4 (obtained by the so-called Combined Administrative Da-
tabase10), it is evident that the earlier (i.e. at the younger age) one benefited from 
Females 40, the lower her benefit and last earning. Comparing the beneficiaries 
of Females 40 with non-retired workers of the same age, we find the following 
difference: until age 57, the latter earn more than the former, but at age 58, the 
situation is reversed. Knowing this tipping point, the birth-cohort dependence of 
pension and earnings depicted in Table 5 becomes clear. We also note that those 
who retired at the normal retirement age are now in an even worse situation.
Table 11 summarises the data of all females retired in the period 2012–2014. 
We emphasise that in all the three years, the number of those retiring in Females 
40 was 1.5–3 times higher than those at or above the normal retirement age; they 
were 4–5 years younger and the difference between the contribution lengths of 
the two categories dropped from 14 to 11 years. Through the zigzagged accrual 
schedule (presented in Table 2 above), the loss of the second category was some-
what lower than suggested by Tables 1 and 7, it remains severe.
10  This database was created by the combination of five administrative organisations’ data. It 
contains the labour force data of 50% of the Hungarian population between 15 and 74 years, 
in a monthly breakdown for the period 2003–2011. To make our calculations, in addition to 
labour force and transfer data, we analysed the NYUFIG data. We have created a detached 
database, which contains the benefit decision and payment, furthermore, it unifies the benefit 
amount on an annual base.
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Table 11. The most important characteristics of female retirees, 2012–2014
Year Type Size Average
age (year)
Average length of 
contribution (year)
Average
relative benefits
2012 Reaching
NRA
0.144 62.6 26.0 0.450
Females 40 0.389 57.8 40.7 0.772
2013 Reaching
NRA
0.195 62.3 28.1 0.485
Females 40 0.324 58.0 40.7 0.731
2014 Reaching
NRA 
0.130 62.8 30.2 0.522
Females 40 0.374 58.3 40.9 0.742
Source: ONYF (2016, p. 51–53, Table 4.1). 
Note: In terms of nationwide net wage.
Figure 4. Monthly average wages in May 2010 at an annual percentage 
of the average wage in 2010
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5. CONCLUSIONS
It is almost a commonplace that in a fair system – in addition to the average 
lifetime earning and within wide limits – the initial benefit is a strongly increas-
ing function of the length of contribution and of the retirement age. Considering 
the pension contribution as forced saving, in the resulting life annuity both the 
lengths of saving and of dissaving periods are important. This principle is fol-
lowed in most countries, but not in Hungary: either the contribution length or the 
retirement age has been decisive. Before 2010, every man or woman with suffi-
ciently long contribution was allowed to retire with full benefit. Since 2011, hav-
ing accumulated 40 years of rights, every woman can retire without any deduc-
tion. On the other hand, except for Females 40, nobody can retire before reaching 
the normal retirement age. For example, in 2016, even 39 years of right did not 
allow a 62 year-old woman to retire, even “paying” serious deduction.
Both the official statistics and our special purpose data set reveal the signifi-
cant distortion implied by the neglect of either the retirement age or the length 
of contribution in the calculation of benefits. The data presented underline the 
surprising fact that in the Hungarian system with exemption, there was a strong 
negative correlation between these two variables. The later one retired, the short-
er was his/her contribution period. This was only possible because a large part of 
the workers – frequently unintended – worked with long breaks. We conjecture 
that this negative correlation survived after 2011, but we cannot document it.
The beneficiaries of Females 40 form a strongly heterogeneous group. Break-
ing down the group by age (and the underlying education level), one can distin-
guish two subgroups: one is disadvantaged (aged 54–56) and another is advan-
taged (aged 58–59), the latter’s members resemble the early retirees. Since 2016, 
most women with a university diploma have the 40-year at the age 63 and then 
the rigid prohibition of early retirement does not affect them. 
Using the data of the Central Statistical Office and the Central Administra-
tion of National Pension Insurance, we also analysed the post 2010 situation. We 
emphasised that Females 40 gives a significant advantage to a lot of women and 
causes also significant and unfair losses to others. The elimination of early male 
retirement has already produced strong tensions and due to further significant rise 
in the normal retirement age, it will become unbearable. In addition, the special 
favour does not apply to those females whose careers are fragmented and at the 
same time, their average net earning is below those of the beneficiaries. 
The new and ad hoc Females 40+ (promulgated in January 2016) tries to miti-
gate this problem in an awkward way: for several months, the government is 
ready to pay the full compensation of those unemployed and previously low-paid 
females to accumulate 40 years of rights, who deserve help – even by the govern-
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ment’s evaluation. The fair solution is so obvious: actuarial reduction of benefits 
at early retirement!
It would be socially optimal to close down Females 40 and introduce flexible 
retirement (successfully applied in most developed countries), which are satisfac-
tory to the employees and the government. The longer the Hungarian government 
insists on the exceptional/rigid system, the stronger the tensions that will be ac-
cumulated. In our opinion, even having introduced a flexible system, following 
a rigid social norm, a lot of workers would still retire as early as possible, even 
if they received reduced pensions. At the same time, we hope that with carefully 
designed parameter values, the foregoing tendency can be limited and a socially 
optimal system can be created which provides room for individual choice within 
certain limits and is at the same time sustainable.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. WELFARE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MECHANISMS 
AND PARTIAL RETIREMENT
(i) In the main text, the gainers and the losers were defined without relying on 
lifetime utility functions. Only direct comparisons were made: the gainers are 
those who obtain higher benefits or have lower net balances in the alternative 
mechanism than in the flexible one. In contrast, Appendix 1 outlines the basics 
of welfare comparison. Let i =1, 2, …, n be the index of various types, fi be the 
share in the population, and M be the alternative system (e.g. linear flexible, 
exceptional, rigid). Let Ui(Ri, Si, bi) be the lifetime utility of type i, and V be the 
utilitarian social welfare function:
 V = ∑i fi Ui(Ri, Si, bi).
To compare two mechanisms M1 and M2, we define M1 is better than M2 if the 
first provides higher welfare than the second. Formally:
 V(M1) > V(M2).
We conjecture in general and show numerically in particular in Appendix 2 
below that in a well-calibrated model, the flexible mechanism typically provides 
higher welfare than either that with exemption or the rigid; therefore the former 
is better than the latter.
(ii) International experts have known for a long period that even the so-called 
flexible (variable) retirement system is not flexible enough, at least with respect 
to the system of partial retirement. Though the international experiences are not 
yet encouraging (even in the Swedish system?), we hope that it is not the idea but 
only the practice that is bad. Here we give its formal description. There are two 
retirement ages: R1 and R2, those of the partial with weight α and of the full retire-
ment, and two rather than one length of contribution: S1 and S2. The net lifetime 
balance is given as  
(1’)  d (R1, R2, S1, S2, w) = τw [S1 +(1– α) S2]– [α eR12 + eR2]b (R1, R2, S 1, S2, T(w)), 
eR12 being the number of expected years spent in interval [R1, R2). Of course, if R1  
= R2  or α =1, then the partial retirement reduces to the flexible one. For d=0, the 
traditional NDC is obtained.
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APPENDIX 2. THE IMPACT OF THE RETIREMENT RULES 
ON THE CORRELATION AND WELFARE
In this Appendix, a simple model is constructed, where the impact of the retire-
ment rules on the correlation coefficient and welfare (numerically represented 
by relative efficiency) can be studied theoretically. We shall show that typically 
as we move smoothly from the exceptional/rigid retirement rules to the flexible 
retirement, the foregoing correlation grows from –1 to 1 and the welfare rises.
Theory
The starting point is that there are groups in the population whose average frag-
mentation rates are different. Let integer n > 1 be the number of groups, k = 1, 
2, …, n be the generic group index. Let L be the common age when people start 
working (possibly including the years spent in higher education) and D be the 
common age when they die. Denote Rk and Sk the retirement age and the years of 
contribution, respectively, and 1– φk be the degree of fragmentation of type k’s 
career. Then by definition, Sk = φk (Rk – L). We shall index the groups in an increas-
ing order of fragmentation: φk >  φk+1 > 0, and  φ1= 1 (nonfragmented career). Let 
fk (> 0) be the population share of group k with ∑k fk =1.
To avoid confusion between the individual-based approach in Section 2 and the 
category-based approach here, we repeat some definition from Section 2. We need 
the expected retirement age and the expected years of contribution, respectively:
 ER =∑k fk Rk and ES =∑k fk Sk  
and their variances: 
 D2R = E(R – ER)2 and D2S = E(S – ES)2 .
Finally we define the correlation coefficient between R and S:
 ρ(R, S) = E((R – ER) (S – ES))/( DR DS) if DR > 0 and DS > 0.
As is known, –1 ≤ ρ(R, S) ≤ 1, and the equalities hold if and only if S = AR +B, 
with A < 0 and A > 0, respectively. (Note that if all the degrees of fragmentation 
were close to each other, then ρ(R, S) ≈ 1 but this is not the case.)
The simplest way to model a family of the retirement rules is the following. 
There is a normal retirement age (R*) and there are two critical values: a critical 
length of contribution (So) and a critical retirement age (Ro). To make the model 
meaningful, it is assumed that type 1 (with full employment) has at least the 
critical length of contribution if (s)he retires at the normal retirement age: So  ≤ 
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R* – L1. It is also assumed that the critical retirement age is at most as high as the 
normal: Ro ≤ R*. 
In case of a sufficiently long contribution, the benefit is proportional to the 
years of contribution and the net wage 1–τ, where τ is the contribution rate and γ 
is the proportionality factor (the accrual rate):
 b(R, S) = γ S (1 – τ)  if  S  ≥So .
In case of sufficiently late retirement, but still below the normal retirement age 
and shorter than critical length of contribution (but at least as long as the minimal 
length Sm), the worker can retire with an annual deduction δ1:
 b(R, S) = γ S (1 – τ)[1+δ1 (R – R*)]  if  Ro  ≤ R  ≤  R*  and  Sm ≤  S  < So.
After reaching the normal retirement age, the second rule gives credit rather 
than deduction:
 b(R, S) = γ S (1 – τ)[1+δ2 (R – R*)] if R ≥  R*  and  S  ≥  Sm.
Otherwise no retirement is allowed. For simplicity, we introduce the notation 
 bk[Rk] = b(Rk, φk (Rk – Lk)).
Note, that our scheme contains the two extreme systems: (i) the exceptional/
rigid with Ro = R* and So < R*–L and (ii) flexible with Ro < R* and So = R* – L1. 
To derive the retirement ages as a function of the retirement rules, we posit a 
standard lifetime utility function. It consists of three terms: the utility enjoyed 
while (i) working, (ii) being idle, and (iii) being retired:
 U[Rk] =  [log (1–τ) – ε] φk (Rk – L)+ [log C – ε] (1–φk )(Rk – Lk)+log bk[Rk] (D – Rk),
where ε is the per-period utility loss due to work or unemployment and C is the 
value of social income.
Finally, we define the per worker balance of the system, i.e. the difference 
between contributions and benefits: 
 B = τ ES –C(ER – ES – L) – E[b[R] (D – R)].
Numerical calculation
Turning to numbers, we choose three types: n =3 and Table A2.1 shows the three 
types’ parameter values.
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Table A2.1. Parameters of the three types, normal case
Types 1 2 3
Shares fk 0.6 0.3 0.1
Nonfragmentation φk 1.0 0.9 0.8
Disutility εk 1.0 1.3 1.7
Note: Model calculations.
Other parameter values are as follows: L = 20, R* = 62, D = 77, C = 0.25. For γ 
= 0.03, the balanced value of c varies around 0.358. The exceptional/rigid system 
is characterised by So  = 40 and Ro  = 62 and the flexible one by So  = 42, Ro  = 60 and 
δ1 = 0.06. We can achieve a smooth transition between the two extreme systems 
with the following equations:
 So  = 40 + 0.5x, Ro  = 62–0.5x and δ1= 0.015 x, x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
To avoid the numerical ambiguity of the social welfare functions, we introduce 
the concept of relative efficiency. Mechanism y’s relative efficiency with respect 
to that of x is a positive real number ω if multiplying the wages and benefits by ω 
in x yields the same welfare as the original y. In formula:
 V[y] = V[x] + (D–L)log ω, i.e. ω = exp { (V[y] – V[x])/(D – L)}. 
Table A2.2 shows the results. As we claimed in the Introduction, during a 
smooth transition from the exceptional/rigid system to the flexible one, the cor-
relation coefficient grows from –1 to 1 and the relative efficiency grows from 
1 to 1.011.
Table A2.2. Transition from the exceptional/rigid system to the flexible one, normal case
Annual
deduction
δ1
Critical Retirement age for type Correla-
tion coeff. 
ρ (R, S)
Relative
efficiency
ω
length of
employ-
ment, So
retire-
ment
age, Ro
1
R1
2
R2
3
R3
0.000 40.0 62.0 60.1 62.0 62.0 –0.875 1.000
0.015 40.5 61.5 60.6 61.5 61.5 –0.895 1.004
0.030 41.0 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0   0.001 1.008
0.045 41.5 60.5 60.9 60.5 60.5   0.914 1.007
0.060 42.0 60.0 62.0 60.4 60.0   1.000 1.011
Note: Model calculations.
In sum, we considered career types with various degrees of fragmentation, 
when the system operates with a critical length of contribution and a critical re-
tirement age plus an adjustment rate. As we raise the critical length and the de-
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duction rate, while diminish the critical age, we move from the exceptional/rigid 
system toward the flexible system, and the signed correlation coefficient between 
the length and age increases from –1 to 1. This signals the improvement of fair-
ness as well.
A counter-example
To show a case where the exceptional/rigid system is more efficient than the 
flexible one is, we choose parameter values where there is no fragmentation, the 
labour disutilities 1 and 3 change places, and the start and exit ages steeply rise 
with the lifespan.
Table A2.3. Parameters of the three types, counter-example 
Types 1 2 3
Shares fk   0.6   0.3 0.1
Disutility εk   1.0   1.3 1.7
Start working Lk 16.0 20.0 22.0
Age at death Dk 70.0 75.0 80.0
Note: Model calculations.
Now the outcome of Table A2.4 is totally different from that of Table A2.2. The 
short-lived worker with heavy labour disutility can take early retirement, while 
the long-lived worker with light burden cannot. The correlation coefficient re-
mains strongly negative, while the relative efficiency first stagnates then it di-
minishes.
Table A2.4. Transition from the exceptional/rigid system to the flexible one, counter-example
Annual
deduction
δ
Critical Retirement age for type Correla-
tion coeff. 
ρ (R, S)
Relative
efficiency
ω
length of
employ-
ment, So
retirement
age, Ro
1
R1
2
R2
3
R3
0.000 40.0 62.0 57.0 62.0 62.0 –0.877 1.000
0.015 40.5 61.5 57.0 61.5 61.5 –0.886 1.000
0.030 41.0 61.0 57.0 61.0 61.4 –0.921 1.001
0.045 41.5 60.5 57.6 60.5 62.0 –0.990 0.999
0.060 42.0 60.0 58.1 60.4 62.0 –1.000 0.997
Note: Model calculations.
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APPENDIX 3. HUNGARIAN LABOUR AND PENSION STATISTICS
Appendix 3 contains some basic statistics used in converting absolute Hungarian 
data into relative ones. We start the description with the basic parameter values 
of the Hungarian pension system. We only display the new parameter values. The 
meaning of the columns except for the last is straightforward: for example, the 
first row shows that in 2005, the male/female normal retirement ages were 62/60, 
the earliest ages were 57/60, and the minimal length of contribution for full bene-
fit was 40/37 years. The last column contains only two symbols: V for varies with 
respect to age, length of contribution, and the calendar year. The second symbol 
-/0 means that there is no early retirement except for Females 40.
Table A3.1. Rising normal and earliest retirement ages and exceptions
Year Normal retirement 
age (m/f)
Earliest
retirement 
age (m/f)
Minimal length of 
contribution for full 
benefit (m/f)
Annual deduction 
rate
2005 62/60 57/60 40/37 V
2006 V
2007 62/61 V
2008 V
2009 62/62 57/60 40/37 V
2010 59/60 40/37 V
2011 60/60 –/40 –/0
2012 –/x –/40 –/0
2013 62
2014 62.5
2015 62.5
2016 63
Notes: m: male; f: female, –: no early retirement; x: only for those, who have right of 40. 
Table A3.2. Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by selected age groups, %
Males Females
Year 55–59 60–64 Total 55–59 60–64 Total
2010 56.3 16.5 54.2 46.6 9.5 43.6
2011 56.9 17.4 55.0 49.9 11.0 43.7
2012 61.2 17.0 55.7 49.7 11.2 44.9
2013 64.9 21.1 57.4 51.4 11.1 45.4
2014 70.6 26.9 60.8 56.8 13.4 48.0
Source: Fazekas – Varga (2015, p. 221, Tables 4.13 and 4.14).
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Table A3.3. Nominal and real earnings
Year Gross earnings
000 HUFs
Net earnings
000 HUFs
Consumer price index 
(previous year)
2010 202.5 132.6 104.9
2011 213.1 141.2 103.9
2012 223.1 144.1 105.7
2013 230.7 151.1 101.7
2014 237.7 155.7   99.8
Source: Fazekas – Varga (2015, p. 241, Table 6.1).
Table A3.4. Number of males and females at normal retirement age (2006–2014)
Year Number of persons (‘000)
Males Females
2006 51.9 60.8a
2007 50.3 60.3b
2008 47.4 64.3b
2009 51.0 63.7
2010 55.0 68.8
2011 57.4 71.1
2012 60.3 73.7
2013 60.6 74.7
2014 59.4c 73.6c
Notes: (a)-(b) The normal female retirement age was only 60 in 2006 and only 61 in 2007 and 2008 (see Table 
A3.1 above). (c) Unisex normal retirement age was already somewhat higher than 62 in 2014.
Table A3.5. Old-age pensioners: retirement ages and numbers: males, females and Females 40
 Males Females Females 40
Year Average 
retirement
age (year)
Size ‘000 Average 
retirement
age (year)
Size ‘000 Average 
retirement
age (year)
Size ‘000
2005 59.9 30.6 57.7 45.1
2006 59.9 33.1 57.5 46.1
2007 59.7 50.9 57.8 62.0
2008 59.8 25.7 57.3 39.3
2009 59.7 37.1 59.9 15.2
2010 60.2 37.2 60.7 13.6
2011 60.3 43.2 58.5 84.9 57.6 54.7
2012 62.0 22.0 59.1 53.6 57.8 27.6
2013 62.2 21.6 59.5 40.6 57.8 24.6
2014 62.2 14.8 59.3 35.6 58.2 26.5
Source: Fazekas – Varga (2015, p. 262, Table 11.5). 
Note: The number for Females 40 in 2011 also contains those who retired earlier but were reclassified in 2011.
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Table A3.6. The size (‘000) and benefits (HUF ‘000) of Hungarian males retired in 2011: 
retirement age and length of contribution
Age
Size and length of contribution Benefit and length of contribution
35–39 40–44 (Total sample) Total 35–39 40–44
(Total sample)
Average
54–55 0.7   0.3   1.9 100.3 108.4   88.5
56–57 0.7   1.1   2.5 108.6 113.2   99.9
58–59 1.1   6.3   9.2 112.5 116.6 114.0
60 2.7 13.7 21.7   78.3 106.3 103.3
61 0.3  1.2   1.8   80.1 157.9 138.8
62–63 1.7  1.7   9.2  79.0 176.0   94.2
Total 8.0 24.2 55.9 89.9 116.8   99.8
Source: ONYF (2012, p. 109, based on Table 9.1). 
Table A3.7. The size (‘000) and benefits (HUF ‘000) of Hungarian females retired in 2011: 
retirement age and length of contribution
Age Size and length of contribution Benefit and length of contribution
30–34 35–39 40–44 (Total sample)
Total
30–34 35–39 40–44 (Total sample)
Average
54–55 0.3 0.7 6.5 8.2 72.7 85.5   90.1   86.4
56–57 0.2 0.9 23.9 25.4 67.2 88.0   96.1   94.9
58–59 0.4 6.3 35.4 42.6 64.2 81.4 110.5 105.5
60 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.9 57.9 81.4 149.5 122.2
61 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 58.6 78.3 156.5 104.4
62–63 1.9 0.4 0.2 8.0 62.2 74.8 155.7   67.1
Total 4.6 9.3 67.5 95.8 68.6 82.0 104.4   93.3
Source: ONYF (2012, p. 110, based on Table 9.2).
